Trump Election Interference / Falsification of Business Records Criminal Trial (Trump guilty on all 34 Counts) (2 Viewers)

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What will happen now that former President Donald Trump was found guilty (in 34 counts) by the jury?
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Speculation on the judge relating to sentencing?
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Appeals?
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Political Damage?
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The verdict on the falsification of records charge was unanimous. Which had expired due to statute of limitations. Hence the need for a predicate crime. I’ve seen no evidence that a singular predicate crime verdict was unanimous.

Are you of the opinion that Ramos v Louisiana established that states are required to meet the 6th requirement of unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases?


This characterization of the New York criminal charges is just not accurate. In New York there are two degrees of falsification of business records. There's second degree (New York Penal Law Sec. 175.05) that relates to various forms of intentional falsification of certain business records - which is a misdemeanor. Then there's first degree falsification of business records (NYPL Sec. 175.10) that provides that when the falsification of business records is done with "an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof", it is first degree - and classified as a felony.

Trump was charged with falsification of business records in the first degree - it is a separate charge from the misdemeanor and has the additional element that requires either intent to commit another crime or that the falsification was done to air or conceal another crime. The jury charges required that in order for Trump to be guilty, each juror must conclude that those elements were present. This issue was briefed at least twice in the case and the jury charges were based on New York case law about the verdicts on the elements of crime.

Ramos stands for the rule of law that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous criminal verdicts - on the crimes the defendant is charged with. Generally speaking, that applies to any criminal verdict but that’s not really the applicable issue in this case: Trump was unanimously convicted on the charges presented by the state. What you're talking about is charges that have predicate crime requirements - where the charge requires that a second ("predicate") crime was committed. Examples include felony murder or some money laundering or racketeering (RICO) charges where an element of the charge is that another crime was committed. As a result, in order to prove the element of the charge that another crime was committed, there is caselaw holding that the jury must unanimously rule that another crime was committed.

The New York business records felony does not require that another crime was committed - it requires the criminal intent to either commit another crime or aid or conceal another crime (even one committed by another person). There is long-standing rule of criminal procedure in American law that while jurors must unanimously find that each element of a crime was committed, they need not be unanimous on the means of how the element was committed. It's an important distinction here - is the first degree element of intent to commit another crime or aid in the concealment of another crime sufficient to trigger the "predicate crime" rule? The state and the court took the position that it is not.

Like I said, it will be interesting to see how it's briefed on appeal but presenting this as a Ramos issue - cut and dry - is just not correct. The rule of unanimous verdicts only becomes relevant if the state must prove to the jury that Trump actually committed the other crime. Certainly such a staunch defender of plain language as yourself must agree that the charge does not so require.
 
You stated the argument pretty well. Seems to me if you are going to take three misdemeanors past the statute of limitations and elevate those to 34 felony counts against a Presidential candidate, you should have to first prove the predicate crime was actually committed beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially important when the FEC declined to pursue the case and where the DA ran his campaign on the promise to get said Presidential candidate.

The predicate crime in this case was a federal charge that the Feds decided not to pursue. It wasn’t a murder charge, theft, sedition, treason but a reporting violation at best.

Mountain meet molehill.

I get that point of view - but it's just not supported by how the statute is written, nor the caselaw that has addressed it.

Intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal another crime is just not the same as having been convicted of another crime. And one can have intent to commit another crime regardless of whether any applicable authority chooses to prosecute that crime.

The whole point isn't about the other crime, it's about the purpose of the falsification of records. Falsifying records for what is not otherwise an unlawful purposes is reasonably a misdemeanor. Falsifying records for an unlawful purpose is more significant.
 
Pretty sure the Supreme Court’s view on a crime is that the specific charge requires unanimous jury verdict in order for it to be a crime. Not a menu of one from column a or b or c.

Yet again, there was a unanimous verdict - the jury unanimously found that the state proved, in each of 34 instances, the elements of the charge of Falsification of Business Records in the First Degree.

As to whether the "intent to commit another crime or to aid and conceal another crime" is a predicate crime requirement, quick research already found at least one NY high court ruling that it's not the same:

"We also reject defendant's contention that a separate crime automatically becomes a material element of falsifying business records in the first degree . . . Read as a whole, it is clear that falsifying business records in the second degree is elevated to a first-degree offense on the basis of an enhanced intent requirement--"an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof"--not any additional actus reus element (Penal Law § 175.10)." People v. Taveras, 12 NY 3d 21 (2009).
 

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