superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
Surely to be a clown show. We know that RFK certainly thinks he’s getting nominated for HHS, which includes FDA.
The Trump Cabinet and key post thread (3 Viewers)
- Thread startersuperchuck500
- Start date
- Latest activity Latest activity:
Users who are viewing this thread
My reference was simply to behavior.That's not what the 'necessary and proper' clause is, but I'll get to that in a minute. I'm more curious about where you looked to find such a power for Congress? A great place to start would be Article I - it gives Congress legislative power that yes, includes power to legislate over matters that include the presidency and the Supreme Court. In fact, you'll find that the legal history of the United States is chock-full of examples where Congress has legislated the presidency (i.e. the executive branch) and the Supreme Court.
Here's an exercise: go to the United States Code website (that's where all of the codified federal statutory law is kept) and in the search bar, type "the president shall". This will give you a search for all of the times in the body of current US statutes where Congress instructs the president to do something. I'll go ahead and tell you that based on the current law in the US Code, there are 1,749 instances where Congress has legislated that the president "shall" do something. If you include all of federal statutory law since the beginning of the United States, I'm sure this number is quite larger.
The relationship between Congress and the executive branch is heavily intertwined but through the lawmaking power, Congress does indeed legislate conduct of the executive branch and even the president himself. The president's tool in the balance against the legislative prerogative is the veto . . . but Congress can override the veto and make law binding upon the president notwithstanding the president's objection.
Congress also exercises legislative power over the Supreme Court, though in a more limited way due to the need for judicial independence that doesn't otherwise encumber the relationship between Congress and the presidency. Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress legislated how many Supreme Court justices there would be and how much they would be paid. Congress has legislated a change in the size of the Supreme Court six times to date. While a few certain parameters of the Court and its membership are set by the Constitution apart from legislation (including lifetime tenure and original jurisdiction) the Constitution also expressly grants Congress authority to regulate appellate jurisdiction . . . and in theory anything else Congress chooses because the Supreme Court's only defense to federal legislation is to find it unconstitutional. For the most part, the Supreme Court will be able to keep its independence as a structural matter but Congress does regulate the Court in some ways including setting pay and in certain administrative aspects. For example, Congress has instructed the Supreme Court to comply with financial disclosure requirements and many believe that a ministerial form of Supreme Court ethics legislation is within Congress' power.
But what we were really talking about is enforcement - and we agreed that impeachment was the only direct tool that Congress had to hold the president, executive branch officials, and Court justices accountable for violation of federal law. I noted that a Congress set on holding the executive branch to the contours of valid statutory law has the appropriations power (the power of the purse) to attempt to use federal funding as an enforcement tool.
You (appearing to disagree) said that Congress is "required to fund" by the necessary and proper clause, suggesting that Congress has no discretion with appropriations because the "necessary and proper" clause demands Congress fund the executive branch. This is just plain nonsense. The necessary and proper clause is what gives Congress the operational latitude (the "elasticity") to conduct legislative functions described in the Constitution - it is the source of all of the implied power that does along with the enumerated powers. "The Necessary and Proper Clause . . . is an enlargement, not a constriction of the powers expressly granted to Congress." (Justia, US Const. Annotated, Article I). In other words, it bestows power, it does not limit it by requiring Congress to act in any required way.
In fact, not only is Congress not compelled by the necessary and proper clause to pass a budget, Congress isn't compelled by any source of law to pass a budget - or to pass any particular budget apart from the one it ultimately passes. But indeed, Article I provides that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury" except that which Congress authorizes . . . which means that Congress holds the ultimate authority to decide what funding the president gets and does not get (because Congress can override presidential veto into federal law). And this means that Congress has significant operational control over what agencies can and cannot do by use of the funding power. A recent CRS report (with full citation) noted that "Congress exercises virtually plenary control over agency funding. This power to determine agency budget authority can be used to control agency priorities, prohibit agency action by denying funds for a specific action, or force agency action by either explicitly providing budget authority for a program or activity or withholding funding until the agency complies with Congress’s wishes."
Congress has institutionally exercised this power in both the Antideficiency Act (prohibiting executive use of funds beyond that which is appropriated) and the Impoundment Act (requiring that appropriated money be spent as provided in the appropriations law and not simply left unspent). These two key funding control laws have two enforcement mechanisms apart from impeachment: (1) they are enforceable by injunction in federal court, placing a non-compliant presidency potentially at odds with both of the other two branches, and (2) the ability for Congress to withhold pay of the offending federal officials along with criminal charges.
But as a matter of means of exerting pressure on the president to conform, both of these laws coupled with the budget process give Congress a powerful enforcement mechanism by simply refusing to fund the president's priority programs or even directly funding their opposite. There are numerous examples where Congress has refused to fund presidential priorities because Congress didn't agree with those priorities.
This, as I am (rightly) contending, is a soft power: If, for example, the president wants funding for dramatic enhancements to immigration enforcement, Congress can insist that the president meet his obligations under federal financial reporting requirements applicable to the president but currently being ignored. This is nothing more than the application of structural politics in the federal system. If the president wants funding for his priorities and Congress is telling him it's not coming unless he meets other obligations under federal law, the president can either comply or see his priorities go unfunded . . . he doesn't have broad discretion to go do it anyway.
But the general trend has certainly been for Congress to continue to cede authority the president and the executive in the name of party-politics and be unwilling to unite for federal structural purposes despite the obvious result that taking such action would check the growing power of any president regardless of party.
Key word in my post was behavior. And ethics is behavior. Alito has said it and Roberts has inferred, congress can’t go there.That's not what the 'necessary and proper' clause is, but I'll get to that in a minute. I'm more curious about where you looked to find such a power for Congress? A great place to start would be Article I - it gives Congress legislative power that yes, includes power to legislate over matters that include the presidency and the Supreme Court. In fact, you'll find that the legal history of the United States is chock-full of examples where Congress has legislated the presidency (i.e. the executive branch) and the Supreme Court.
Here's an exercise: go to the United States Code website (that's where all of the codified federal statutory law is kept) and in the search bar, type "the president shall". This will give you a search for all of the times in the body of current US statutes where Congress instructs the president to do something. I'll go ahead and tell you that based on the current law in the US Code, there are 1,749 instances where Congress has legislated that the president "shall" do something. If you include all of federal statutory law since the beginning of the United States, I'm sure this number is quite larger.
The relationship between Congress and the executive branch is heavily intertwined but through the lawmaking power, Congress does indeed legislate conduct of the executive branch and even the president himself. The president's tool in the balance against the legislative prerogative is the veto . . . but Congress can override the veto and make law binding upon the president notwithstanding the president's objection.
Congress also exercises legislative power over the Supreme Court, though in a more limited way due to the need for judicial independence that doesn't otherwise encumber the relationship between Congress and the presidency. Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress legislated how many Supreme Court justices there would be and how much they would be paid. Congress has legislated a change in the size of the Supreme Court six times to date. While a few certain parameters of the Court and its membership are set by the Constitution apart from legislation (including lifetime tenure and original jurisdiction) the Constitution also expressly grants Congress authority to regulate appellate jurisdiction . . . and in theory anything else Congress chooses because the Supreme Court's only defense to federal legislation is to find it unconstitutional. For the most part, the Supreme Court will be able to keep its independence as a structural matter but Congress does regulate the Court in some ways including setting pay and in certain administrative aspects. For example, Congress has instructed the Supreme Court to comply with financial disclosure requirements and many believe that a ministerial form of Supreme Court ethics legislation is within Congress' power.
But what we were really talking about is enforcement - and we agreed that impeachment was the only direct tool that Congress had to hold the president, executive branch officials, and Court justices accountable for violation of federal law. I noted that a Congress set on holding the executive branch to the contours of valid statutory law has the appropriations power (the power of the purse) to attempt to use federal funding as an enforcement tool.
You (appearing to disagree) said that Congress is "required to fund" by the necessary and proper clause, suggesting that Congress has no discretion with appropriations because the "necessary and proper" clause demands Congress fund the executive branch. This is just plain nonsense. The necessary and proper clause is what gives Congress the operational latitude (the "elasticity") to conduct legislative functions described in the Constitution - it is the source of all of the implied power that does along with the enumerated powers. "The Necessary and Proper Clause . . . is an enlargement, not a constriction of the powers expressly granted to Congress." (Justia, US Const. Annotated, Article I). In other words, it bestows power, it does not limit it by requiring Congress to act in any required way.
In fact, not only is Congress not compelled by the necessary and proper clause to pass a budget, Congress isn't compelled by any source of law to pass a budget - or to pass any particular budget apart from the one it ultimately passes. But indeed, Article I provides that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury" except that which Congress authorizes . . . which means that Congress holds the ultimate authority to decide what funding the president gets and does not get (because Congress can override presidential veto into federal law). And this means that Congress has significant operational control over what agencies can and cannot do by use of the funding power. A recent CRS report (with full citation) noted that "Congress exercises virtually plenary control over agency funding. This power to determine agency budget authority can be used to control agency priorities, prohibit agency action by denying funds for a specific action, or force agency action by either explicitly providing budget authority for a program or activity or withholding funding until the agency complies with Congress’s wishes."
Congress has institutionally exercised this power in both the Antideficiency Act (prohibiting executive use of funds beyond that which is appropriated) and the Impoundment Act (requiring that appropriated money be spent as provided in the appropriations law and not simply left unspent). These two key funding control laws have two enforcement mechanisms apart from impeachment: (1) they are enforceable by injunction in federal court, placing a non-compliant presidency potentially at odds with both of the other two branches, and (2) the ability for Congress to withhold pay of the offending federal officials along with criminal charges.
But as a matter of means of exerting pressure on the president to conform, both of these laws coupled with the budget process give Congress a powerful enforcement mechanism by simply refusing to fund the president's priority programs or even directly funding their opposite. There are numerous examples where Congress has refused to fund presidential priorities because Congress didn't agree with those priorities.
This, as I am (rightly) contending, is a soft power: If, for example, the president wants funding for dramatic enhancements to immigration enforcement, Congress can insist that the president meet his obligations under federal financial reporting requirements applicable to the president but currently being ignored. This is nothing more than the application of structural politics in the federal system. If the president wants funding for his priorities and Congress is telling him it's not coming unless he meets other obligations under federal law, the president can either comply or see his priorities go unfunded . . . he doesn't have broad discretion to go do it anyway.
But the general trend has certainly been for Congress to continue to cede authority the president and the executive in the name of party-politics and be unwilling to unite for federal structural purposes despite the obvious result that taking such action would check the growing power of any president regardless of party.
And the necessary and proper simply requires funding to operate the executive and judicial offices.
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #110
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
What sort of nonsensical distinction is that? The context was Trump not filing financial disclosures and violating the Emoluments Clause - isn't that "behavior"? It's also legal requirement and if Congress wants to attempt to pressure the president into compliance, it has tools at its disposal. Congress can instruct, in the form of federal statute, the president to do something (i.e. "the president shall") - isn't that "behavior"? And Congress can use its funding power to pressure the president into complying with that law, compliance is behavior. What are you talking about.
And show me one single authority on the proposition that the necessary and proper clause requires Congress to fund the executive and judicial offices. It allows Congress latitude to accomplish its powers including how it may exercise the funding power but it doesn't require Congress to do anything - including fund the executive and judicial offices.
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #111
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
- Thread starter
- #112
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
Not a Trump post but the Senate Majority Leader will be John Thune (R-SD).
Republicans reject Trump allies' pick, elect John Thune as next Senate majority leader
John Thune, 63, defeated Sens. John Cornyn and Rick Scott in the secret-ballot vote to succeed Mitch McConnell as Senate majority leader.
www.usatoday.com
Do his ties to white nationalist extremists give you any cause for concern, Mr Trump apologist? His advocating for war criminals to be pardoned? His anti-Muslim views? His misogyny? Anti-Semitism?
The more I read about him the more I find out he’s completely unfit for office.
It’s a barely concealed scam.
J-DONK
Well-known member
Offline
It's something out of a show like VEEP.
Last edited:
Given the current Supreme Court, Congress doesn’t have the power to regulate the president and his staff with regards to ethics.
The emoluments clause applies to offices of profit or trust. Do some research on offices of profit or trust. They are not elected, they are appointed. Enough folks on Capitol Hill know that. That’s why nothing ever came from it.
J-DONK
Well-known member
Offline
I feel like a lot of people forgot about the massive grifting that went on during the Trump presidency.
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #118
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
My God you're impossible - and endlessly wrong. Without ever offering any support for any of this nonsense, you move on the next nonsensical point that I can only surmise is based upon nothing more than your most basic perception.
No, the Supreme Court will not rule that Congress' refusal to fund a Trump priority is unconstitutional. And no, you're also wrong that emoluments don't apply to the president. There are two distinct emoluments clauses and both apply to the president (the foreign clause where the 'offices of profit and trust' language comes from and the domestic emoluments clause that expressly refers to the president). "The OLC has generally presumed that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the President, and the only district court to consider the issue (in District of Columbia v. Trump) came to the same conclusion." Congressional Research Service (Jan. 27, 2021). The OLC's opinions about presidential emoluments include a Kennedy opinion in 1964, and two Reagan opinions in 1981 and 1983.
In September 2019, the Second Circuit ruled that a case against Trump for violating emoluments could go forward - and while the primary issue was one of standing, there was never any doubt from the court that the underlying allegation of presidential violation of the emoluments clause was valid. By the time the Supreme Court got to it, Trump's term was over and the case dismissed as moot.
Reading the Office of Legal Counsel on Emoluments: Do Super-Rich Presidents Get a Pass?
I wrote last November that the Foreign Emoluments Clause “is on its face a national security provision designed to protect the country from officers too enmeshed
www.lawfaremedia.orgNever said fund a priority. Said Fund the operation of the executive office. Fund the operation of the Supreme Court. Necessary and proper. Constitution says do it.My God you're impossible - and endlessly wrong. Without ever offering any support for any of this nonsense, you move on the next nonsensical point that I can only surmise is based upon nothing more than your most basic perception.
No, the Supreme Court will not rule that Congress' refusal to fund a Trump priority is unconstitutional. And no, you're also wrong that emoluments don't apply to the president. There are two distinct emoluments clauses and both apply to the president (the foreign clause where the 'offices of profit and trust' language comes from and the domestic emoluments clause that expressly refers to the president). "The OLC has generally presumed that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the President, and the only district court to consider the issue (in District of Columbia v. Trump) came to the same conclusion." Congressional Research Service (Jan. 27, 2021). The OLC's opinions about presidential emoluments include a Kennedy opinion in 1964, and two Reagan opinions in 1981 and 1983.
In September 2019, the Second Circuit ruled that a case against Trump for violating emoluments could go forward - and while the primary issue was one of standing, there was never any doubt from the court that the underlying allegation of presidential violation of the emoluments clause was valid. By the time the Supreme Court got to it, Trump's term was over and the case dismissed as moot.
Reading the Office of Legal Counsel on Emoluments: Do Super-Rich Presidents Get a Pass?
I wrote last November that the Foreign Emoluments Clause “is on its face a national security provision designed to protect the country from officers too enmeshed
They said it could go forward. The history of offices of profit or trust would sink it.
Do the research on the history of offices of profit or trust. Not an invention of the founders. Preceded them by about 400 years. The Supreme Court certainly would. I’m pretty sure they already know.
Article II. “but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” Distinctly different.
Last edited:
Optimus Prime
Well-known member
Offline
Trump picks ex-Rep. Tulsi Gabbard as director of national intelligence, Rubio for Secretary of State
President-elect Donald Trump has chosen Tulsi Gabbard, a former Democratic member of Congress and presidential candidate, to serve as director of national intelligence, continuing to stock his Cabinet with loyal personalities complimentary to his own, rather than long-term professionals in their req
apnews.com- Thread starter
- #121
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
Unserious president. This is all so stupid.
samiam5211
Well-known member
Offline
Insanity
- Thread starter
- #123
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
faceman
Well-known member
Offline
MAGA members are venting their anger on my senators FB page. They wanted Rick Scott. Roger Wicker supportedNot a Trump post but the Senate Majority Leader will be John Thune (R-SD).
Republicans reject Trump allies' pick, elect John Thune as next Senate majority leader
John Thune, 63, defeated Sens. John Cornyn and Rick Scott in the secret-ballot vote to succeed Mitch McConnell as Senate majority leader.www.usatoday.com
Thune. I know it's a small victory,but I'll take it.
- Thread starter
- #125
OP
OP
superchuck500
U.S. Blues
Offline
Gaetz was officially a lawyer for about two years straight out of law school but it’s not clear what work he did.
Total clown selection.
RobF
Well-known member
Offline
To be fair, he does have some significant experience of legal trouble from the other side of things as well doesn't he?
DOJ won't charge Matt Gaetz in sex-trafficking probe as lawyer for minor calls investigation 'difficult experience'
The DOJ has informed lawyers representing witnesses that it will not bring charges against Rep. Matt Gaetz after a sex-trafficking probe into the Florida congressman.
Yeah, this is nuts.
Create an account or login to comment
You must be a member in order to leave a comment
Create account
Create an account on our community. It's easy!
Log in
Already have an account? Log in here.